The U.S. Coast Guard released its final report on the implosion of OceanGate’s Titan submersible in June 2023, finding problems at nearly every level.
The 335-page report was the result of over two years of investigation, including a two-week hearing held last year. The report found problems ranging from a toxic work environment to a failure to follow engineering protocol. OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, who was among the five crew members who died in the implosion, was held primarily responsible.
“A false sense of safety and security was created by Mr. Rush through his misrepresentation of the TITAN’s safety, achieved by falsely claiming substantial safety margins, misleading mission specialists regarding testing procedures, and exaggerating the number of hull test dives for the final TITAN hull,” the report read.
Rush was repeatedly warned of the severe design and safety flaws with the Titan, only to ignore or threaten those who brought up the issues. He created a “toxic work place environment which used firings of senior staff members and the looming threat of being fired to dissuade employees and contractors from expressing safety concerns,” the report claimed.
Part of the issue was the severe financial pressures that took a heavy toll in 2023, prompting Rush to eschew safety protocols in an attempt to recover. Employees were asked to accept a suspended salary with the promise of receiving back pay later.
The fatal factor was Rush’s avoidance of critical safety inspections and neglect of maintenance, with the Coast Guard noting “glaring disparities between their written safety protocols and their actual practices.”
Had Rush survived, the Coast Guard would have asked the Department of Justice to pursue a criminal investigation into him.
Rush wasn’t the only one at fault, however. The report found that domestic and international regulatory frameworks were “insufficient to address the complexities of modern submersible technologies and practices.”
The litany of problems came together on June 28, 2023, when a loss of structural integrity exposed the five passengers to 4,930 pounds per square inch of water pressure, resulting in their “instantaneous death.”
Overall, the Coast Guard concluded that the disaster was “preventable.”
The Coast Guard report serves to confirm many early revelations exposing the deluge of problems that plagued OceanGate. Within a week of the Titan’s implosion, a report from the New Yorker found that the vessel’s electrical system was designed by college interns.
Rush was quickly identified as having made numerous false statements about the Titan, leading to a false sense of security. He claimed to have had design and testing partnerships with Boeing and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, despite such partnerships never existing. He also falsely claimed that one iteration of the Titan’s hull would be built at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama.
CREW OF TITAN SUBMERSIBLE IMPLOSION EXPERIENCED ‘TERROR AND MENTAL ANGUISH,’ SUIT ALLEGES
The toxic workplace culture was also quickly revealed. OceanGate’s most experienced expert, Scottish submariner and engineer David Lochridge, was fired and threatened with retaliation when he wrote a secret report warning of the severe design issues with the craft.
The family of one of the deceased passengers sued OceanGate for $50 million in August, alleging that the crew suffered “terror and mental anguish” immediately before their deaths.
